#4 The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam: Part 2

The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), and the political history behind its construction, implicates the changing power dynamics between the three riparians of the Blue Nile. Most notably, this change has seen challenge to Egyptian hydro-hegemony, Ethiopian strengthening of bargaining power and new sub-alliances between Sudan and Ethiopia (Endaylalu 2019). The hydropolitical situation has been notable for the strong co-existence of conflict and cooperation. This coexistence has, despite challenge, opened up the possibility for increased economic and political cooperation between the three states. 

The announcement of the GERD in 2011 followed the stalemate of political cooperation between the three states, as deliberation over the Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA) failed when Ethiopia pushed for a ‘water security’ clause, 14b (Tawfik 2016; see also, previous article here). Ethiopia’s proceeding decision to ratify the CFA without Egypt and Sudan, along with other upstream riparians, is a key tipping point in Nile relations and a true challenge to Egyptian hegemony (Cascão and Nicol 2016). Egypt and Sudan both left the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) in protest, though Sudan subsequently rejoined, resulting in political stalemate.
 
Amidst this stalemate, Ethiopia likely experienced development fatigue, as it had pinned high hopes on the NBI to facilitate large-scale development projects which hadn’t come to fruition (Arsano and Tamrat 2005). This occurred at a time of improved political stability, strong leadership, new economic partnerships with China and strong 10% GDP growth per year in Ethiopia (Cascão and Nicol 2016). Meanwhile Egypt, previously the most economically prosperous and politically stable, experienced decline in GDP, political and social instability (The Egyptian Spring of 2011) and rapid changes to Nile decision-making bodies (Cascão and Nicol 2016).
 
During the 1990s, the NBI helped reduce the power asymmetry in the Basin by increasing the knowledge base and agency of the other upstream riparians. Various NBI projects and studies helped provide hydrological and socio-economic analysis (Giupponi and Sgobbi 2013). This bridged knowledge gaps between the riparians and empowered the upstream riparians in their ability to influence the political agenda and form policy (Cascão and Nicol 2016). This likely helped Ethiopia achieve its role as impromptu leader of the upstream riparians, evident in its push for the Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA) formulated in 1997 (NBI 1997). 
 
Arguably in response to the stalemate, Ethiopia announced its GERD proposal in 2011. This resulted in the flagrant panic, emblematic of challenge to its hydro-hegemony, of Egyptian leadership with first the rejection of the GERD, threats to sabotage the dam, and then eventual deliberation with Ethiopia over the GERD’s inevitable construction (Cascão and Nicol 2016). Sudan broke with its neighbouring downstream riparian and approved the GERD, highlighting Ethiopia's ability to influence the agenda in the Basin (Endaylalu 2019).

 
In 2015, the heads of state of each Blue Nile riparian signed the Declaration of Principles in Khartoum. This Declaration set out 10 commonly accepted principles of international water law between the heads of state of Ethiopia, Egypt and Sudan, including key terms like ‘no significant harm’ and respect for ‘equitable and reasonable utilization’ (Agreement 2015). Crucially, though the Declaration is beyond the scope of the 1959 treaty, enshrining Egyptian and Sudanese access to the Nile’s resources, Egypt signed the pseudo-legal framework agreement the Declaration represents (Cascão and Nicol 2016).  
 
The signing of the Declaration in 2015 represents cooperation of a kind in the Basin. Though co-existing with various conflicts, most notably the lack of Egyptian membership in the NBI and lack of a standing Nile Basin Commission, the multilateral negotiations between the states is progress. It also opens up possibilities for the GERD to facilitate significant economic cooperation and trade. For example, if Egypt connects to the planned Eastern Africa Power Pool, a regional power grid, the three countries could all enjoy cheap access to hydropower (Cascão and Nicol 2016). Thus, the GERD could usher in future cooperation in other ventures beyond hydropower.

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Edit (30th November 2020): Ongoing conflict between the Ethiopian federal government and the rebel group - the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) - has caused serious political instability and loss of life. The United Nations has warned that the federal government's suppression of the TPLF - an ethnic minority group - is close to constituting a genocide for its ethnically-targeted violence (UN 2020). Some pundits have also contended that the ensuing civil war may be used as a precursor for Egypt to move in on Ethiopia's GERD (The Guardian 2020).