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#8 - Concluding Remarks

In concluding my blog, I want to acknowledge an aspect I have somewhat neglected:  scale . The majority of my attention has focused on interstate cooperation (or lack of). However, interstate cooperation does not necessarily lead to water security for people who desperately need it ( Pittman 2004 ). Nor does it inherently address sustainability. In hindsight, both the neglect of sustainability in cooperative arrangements and more attention to the local would likely strengthen this blog. In the seven blogs posted thus far, I have covered a range of hydropolitical topics in so far as they affect the Nile River Basin. I began by discussing my thoughts on representation – white Western voices often occlude African (and indeed local) voices on key hydropolitical issues. I then elaborated a hydropolitical framework, highlighting the balance of power between the riparians on the Nile, with Egypt as  de facto  hydrohegemon. I demonstrated that this hegemony is being challenged by the upstream
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#7 - Climate Change

An account of the Nile would be incomplete without engaging with climate change. Undoubtedly, climate change is going to affect all riparians in the Nile basin by increasing the variability and regional scarcity of water ( Goulden  et al . 2010 ). However, the capacity to cope with water stress will likely vary significantly between riparians both because of their individual water resources and institutions and because of state consumption. At root, there is a great deal of uncertainty because of multiple global climate models ( Conway 2005 ). And this uncertainty is often concealed by aggregate metrics and simplistic approaches to water scarcity ( Zeitoun  et al . 2016 ). Open cooperation based on reliable data is likely the only solution to sustainable use of the Nile basin.   The Nile is projected to see some reduction in runoff by 2050 ( Aaerts  et al.  2006 ;  Manabe  et al . 2004 ) or a large increase in runoff ( Arnell 2003 ;  Milly  et al.  2005 ). Either scenario will see con

#6 - Turn Back the Clock

William Golding once said, ‘he who rides the sea of the Nile must have sails woven of patience’. Golding, revered author of  Lord of the Flies , lived as the sun finally  did  set on the British Empire. He evokes the patience required to traverse the Nile. Interpreted more broadly, the quotation indicts the lengthy struggle of colonial powers for a controlling stake in the Nile.   As I have touched on in previous posts, colonial powers exerted great influence over the Nile. In this post I unpack a few of the major historic events. Of key importance is to recognise that many treaties favoured colonial objectives rather than the fair allocation of water for African states ( Kimenyi and Mbaku 2015 ). A total of 150 transboundary water treaties have been signed over 140 years in Africa ( Lautze and Giordano 2005 ). Over 60 percent concern the Nile basin ( Lautze and Giordano 2005 ).   In the case of the Nile, there are two major positions on the succession of colonial treaties for post-col

#5 - Chinese Credit and Western Exit

Foreign involvement in East Africa is not novel. The region’s history is coloured by colonial interference which left behind a turbulent state of affairs ( Kimenyi and Mbaku 2015 ). More recent involvement has seen a growing tension between American and Chinese involvement in the region. But what exactly is this interference, and what is the current role of foreign powers in East Africa?   My past two blog posts looked at the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) – a mammoth hydroelectric dam – almost entirely funded by Ethiopia and set to change the power relations in the Nile Basin. These posts considered the history of the political situation between the Nile riparians, concluding with the immense shakeup the GERD represents to Egyptian hydro-hegemony.    The GERD has become emblematic of a continental tension between American – and broadly Western – versus Chinese investment. Where once the World Bank was the key financier in Africa, today China has stepped in to replace it as th

#4 The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam: Part 2

The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) , and the political history behind its construction, implicates the changing power dynamics between the three riparians of the Blue Nile. Most notably, this change has seen challenge to Egyptian hydro-hegemony, Ethiopian strengthening of bargaining power and new sub-alliances between Sudan and Ethiopia ( Endaylalu 2019 ). The hydropolitical situation has been notable for the strong co-existence of conflict and cooperation. This coexistence has, despite challenge, opened up the possibility for increased economic and political cooperation between the three states.  The announcement of the GERD in 2011 followed the stalemate of political cooperation between the three states, as deliberation over the  Cooperative Framework Agreement  (CFA) failed when Ethiopia pushed for a ‘water security’ clause, 14b ( Tawfik 2016 ; see also, previous article  here ). Ethiopia’s proceeding decision to ratify the CFA without Egypt and Sudan, along with other upstr

#3 The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam: Part 1

The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), estimated to generate 5,150 megawatts of power and at a cost of around $5 billion ( Tractebel 2020 ), is likely the beginning of an Ethiopian socio-economic boom. The GERD, along with the  Gilgel Gibe III Dam  constructed in 2015, are set to quadruple Ethiopia’s electricity generation capacity ( Spectrum 2017 ), contributing to the electrification of the state. More so, this megaproject has the potential to earn Ethiopia billions in electricity exports , bring electricity to millions and confirm Ethiopia’s rising power in the region ( NYTimes   2020 ;  Whittington, Wu and Sadoff 2005 ).   The construction of the GERD (see Figure 1), as well as the profoundly controversial issue of filling the GERD ( Tawfik 2016 ), exemplify the principles of hydropolitics introduced in my  previous post . The politics of the Nile Basin and the GERD are incredibly complex, so this topic will be a two-part blog. This first  post  will focus on the geography and

#2 Moving Beyond Water Wars

Sensationalist media and the desire for headline grabbing news has often framed hydropolitics as only consisting of ‘water wars’ ( Endaylalu 2019 );   The Independent  has an entire topic dedicated. This macabre obsession has only intensified with the increasing strain climate change has placed on water resources. The reality of hydropolitics, however, is marred with cooperation as much as it is conflict ( Yoffe et al. 2003 ).   Critical theorists have suggested moving beyond this ‘conflict-cooperation continuum’ ( Delli-Priscoli 1996 ) as it often results in reductionist analysis. In other words, rather than focusing on the extent to which a hydropolitical deliberation is defined as conflict or   a cooperation, focus on the  interaction  between riparian actors. This shift in focus allows for a more nuanced understanding of power relations and how they change over time. Key to these interactions is the asymmetry in power of riparians, or in political jargon,  hydro-hegemony .   Hydro-