The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), estimated to generate 5,150 megawatts of power and at a cost of around $5 billion (Tractebel 2020), is likely the beginning of an Ethiopian socio-economic boom. The GERD, along with the Gilgel Gibe III Dam constructed in 2015, are set to quadruple Ethiopia’s electricity generation capacity (Spectrum 2017), contributing to the electrification of the state. More so, this megaproject has the potential to earn Ethiopia billions in electricity exports, bring electricity to millions and confirm Ethiopia’s rising power in the region (NYTimes 2020; Whittington, Wu and Sadoff 2005).
The construction of the GERD (see Figure 1), as well as the profoundly controversial issue of filling the GERD (Tawfik 2016), exemplify the principles of hydropolitics introduced in my previous post. The politics of the Nile Basin and the GERD are incredibly complex, so this topic will be a two-part blog. This first post will focus on the geography and history of the Eastern Nile Basin where the GERD is located. The second part will unpack some of the politics behind the GERD and how the GERD may be a catalyst for shifting power between Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan.
The Eastern Nile (also known as the “Blue Nile”) flows from Lake Tana in Ethiopia, through Sudan and merges with the “White Nile” in Khartoum to form the Main Nile which enters Egypt (Wheeler et al. 2016). The GERD lies upstream in Ethiopia and will greatly control the flow of the Blue Nile (Figure 2).
Hydropolitics in the Eastern Nile is characterised by a history of hostility. Indeed, prior to the 1990s, interactions in the basin were marked by ‘oppositional regimes of international water law’ and strong rhetoric (Brunnee and Toope 2002). This was largely a result of postcolonial treaties: the 1929 treaty ensured any development on the Nile required the consent of Egypt and the 1959 bilateral agreement between Egypt and Sudan guaranteed them the right of 55.5 billion m3 per year of water (Tvedt 2009). In sum, treaties prior to the turn of the century enshrined rights primarily for downstream riparians (Egypt and Sudan), and did so under confrontational and exploitative terms.
This hydropolitical situation – one of hydro-hegemony by the downstream riparians, particularly Egypt - laid the backdrop to the developmental situation in the region. While the downstream riparians had made good use of the Nile’s resources, Ethiopia and the other upstream riparians had little hydraulic infrastructure and lacked any agreements defining their own riparian access to the Nile (Arsano and Tamrat 2005). As of 2001, Ethiopia had only tapped into 3 percent of its hydropower potential, only developed 5 percent of the Blue Nile Basin for food production and only 17 percent of the country’s population had access to electricity, 94 percent of which was still reliant on wood burning for fuel (Arjooon et al. 2014).
Development upstream was supported by the international community, beginning with a collaborative project in 1964 with the US Bureau of Reclamation to find potential sites for hydropower projects on the Blue Nile (Wheeler et al. 2016). Hydropower development, and its ensuring electrification, was contended to be a key national and international poverty reduction target (Ministry of Finance and Economic Development 2006; United Nations 2010). In the 1990s cooperation between riparians on the Nile began, notably with multilateral cooperative institutions like the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI). These cooperative efforts were supported by the international community[i].
In 2011, the Ethiopian government announced its intention to develop the GERD. This was met with immediate resistance from the downstream riparians. Egypt argued the GERD would restrict its access to the Nile, in breach of the aforementioned treaties and despite the fact the upstream riparians have alternative water resources (Arjoon et al. 2014). However, studies of the Nile have found that, if cooperation is successful, the GERD would increase benefits for all riparians (Guariso and Whittington 1987; Wheeler et al. 2016). This suggests the challenge to Egyptian hydro-hegemony may be just as strong an objection as Egypt's concern for water security.
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