#2 Moving Beyond Water Wars

Sensationalist media and the desire for headline grabbing news has often framed hydropolitics as only consisting of ‘water wars’ (Endaylalu 2019); The Independent has an entire topic dedicated. This macabre obsession has only intensified with the increasing strain climate change has placed on water resources. The reality of hydropolitics, however, is marred with cooperation as much as it is conflict (Yoffe et al. 2003). 

Critical theorists have suggested moving beyond this ‘conflict-cooperation continuum’ (Delli-Priscoli 1996) as it often results in reductionist analysis. In other words, rather than focusing on the extent to which a hydropolitical deliberation is defined as conflict or a cooperation, focus on the interaction between riparian actors. This shift in focus allows for a more nuanced understanding of power relations and how they change over time. Key to these interactions is the asymmetry in power of riparians, or in political jargon, hydro-hegemony.  

Hydro-hegemony can be defined as ‘hegemony at the river basin level, achieved through water resource control strategies…that are enabled by the exploitation of existing power asymmetries’ (Zeitoun and Warner 2006). This term captures the diverging levels of, and ability to effectuate, power in river basin control. Whilst this term does not suggest conflict like the ‘water wars’ discourse, it does suggest that there is a politics involved in river basin management. And this politics is not an even or static one.
 
Hydropolitics can be boiled down to a framework to help evaluate how a riparian can exert control. In short, the key four characterises are (Cascão and Zeitoun 2010): 

1. Geographical power: is an overt form of power determined mostly by the physical location of a riparian on the river basin (an upstream riparian is typically better situated to control the flow of a river through, for example, dam construction).
2. Material power: is also an overt form of power, determined by economic, military, technological or international support metrics.
3. Bargaining power: is a covert form of power, determined by the ‘capacity of actors to control the rules of the game and set agendas’.
4. Ideational power: is the capacity of a state to legitimise an ideological stance on an issue. 

 
These four characteristics are interlinked and incredibly dynamic, and the ability of a riparian to exert power through this four-part constitution is being constantly challenged. Critical hydropolitics adds that these four facets are not equal (Cascão and Zeitoun 2010). For example, Ethiopia - an upstream riparian - controls 85% of the flow of the Nile and therefore has geographical power, but is typically considered a non-hegemonic (or weaker) state than its downstream neighbour Egypt, despite its geographic advantage (see Figure 1) (Cascão and Zeitoun 2010).

 

Figure 1 - Suggested power distribution of three key Nile basin riparians. Notably, Egypt dominates across the four characteristic markers of power exertion and is thus considered a regional hegemon. Source: Cascão and Zeitoun 2010: 33.

Ethiopia’s profile demonstrates that although geographic power is important, it doesn't necessarily amount to hydro-hegemony. Indeed, Egypt has strength across three of the markers of power exertion and, despite no geographical advantage, is thus considered the hydro-hegemon. However, the balance of power between the states is constantly being contested through 'counter-hegemonic' strategies (Cascão 2008).

 
Egypt has traditionally been the strongest of the Nile Basin riparian states[1] (Cascão and Zeitoun 2010). The 1990s saw the first challenge to this status quo when the riparians began negotiating a cooperative institution: the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI). As part of these deliberations the states agreed that, at the directive of Ethiopia, a new legal framework be negotiated in parallel to the NBI: the Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA) which, initiated in 1997, outlines the principles of management of Nile resources (Cascão and Zeitoun 2010). 
 
Part of these negotiations was a ‘water security’ article (14b) which indirectly challenged Egyptian and Sudanese rights to Nile resources and historic treaties like the 1959 Sudan-Egypt Water Agreement (Tawfik 2016). As a block, the upstream riparians voted in favour of this article. Sudan and Egypt, however, entered into an ‘active stalling’ strategy to ensure the status quo remained (Cascão and Zeitoun 2010). 
 
As a counter-hegemonic strategy, the upstream riparians utilised their bargaining power and in May 2009, proceeded with the ratification of the CFA. This move was tactical, as only a two-thirds majority was required to ratify the CFA in order to establish the NBI. And more broadly, it reflected the ability of non-hegemonic states, to increase their bargaining power and reduce that of the hegemon (see Figure 2) (Tawfik 2016).

Figure 2: The redistribution of power in the Nile basin following counter-hegemonic strategies. Ethiopia has gained bargaining power and Egypt's bargaining power has been reduced. Source: Cascão and Zeitoun 2010: 189.

 

Ethiopia's actions are thus emblematic of how a riparian can challenge hegemonic power in the Nile. Ethiopian exertions of power also illuminate a more nuanced understanding of hydropolitics than water wars hyperbole. My remaining posts will build on this theoretical framework of hydropolitics.

---

[1] Egypt’s hegemonic power owes credit to colonial agreements signed between Egypt and Britain, and also because of its economic and military dominance in the region (Tawfik 2016). See my later post for more.